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The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(i). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW AND 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
A. Did the trial court properly determine visitation rights? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. Crockett v. 
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 819-820 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Turner v. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982)). 
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court: The only act by 
plaintiff's counsel, David E. Bean, that could possibly be 
interpreted as an attempt to preserve a visitation issue in the 
trial court was Mr. Bean's comment at trial that if plaintiff had 
to transport the parties7 minor child to defendant's church, it may 
impact plaintiff's own church attendance. The trial judge 
clarified that defendant was responsible to transport the minor 




STATUTE*! AUD R U L E S WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. STATEMILiri i HIK PAfTS 
T r i a l u£ t h e c u s t o d y i s s u e in t h i s b i f u r c a t e d c a s e commenced 
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Augiihl II1 I i l l Mi I in iteyiewed t l iese documents and d i s c u s s e d 
certain changes with Mr. Peterson who then modified the documents 
and mailed them to Mr. Bean again on September 9, 1994. Thereafter 
Mr. Bean failed to interpose any objection to the form of the 
documents in the trial court. On November 23, 1994, Mr. Peterson 
submitted the documents to the trial judge for signature. Mr. Bean 
was notified that the documents were being submitted for signature. 
The documents were signed by the trial judge on November 30, 1994 
and entered December 1, 1994. (See Appellant's principal brief, 
hereinafter Apb, 7; R. 253, a copy of which is included as an 
addendum hereto) 
To this day, plaintiff has failed to file a motion under Rule 
60(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or otherwise give the trial 
court an opportunity to correct any alleged clerical error in the 
Divorce Decree and/or Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff has raised issues relating to visitation during the 
minor child's Christmas school vacation and on alternating weekends 
for the first time on appeal. Generally, appellate courts will not 
consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Plaintiff 
should make the trial court aware of any clerical errors in the 
Decree or Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law so the court has 
3 
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A. THE ISSUES RELATING TO VISITATION DURING THE 
CHRISTMAS SCHOOL VACATION AND ON ALTERNATING WEEKENDS ARE 
RAISED BY PLAINTIFF FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue 
raised for the first time on appeal. Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. 
of Educ. . 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990); Wade v. Stanql. 869 P.2d 
9, 11 (Utah App. 1994); Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 
App. 1992) . A trial court should be allowed the first opportunity 
to address a claim that it has erred. State v. Ranqel, 866 P.2d 
607, 611 (Utah App. 1993). 
Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires an appellant to include citations to the record showing 
that each issue was preserved in the trial court or provide a 
statement of the grounds for seeking review of issues not preserved 
at trial. If appellants have failed to properly preserve an issue 
for appeal, they have waived that issue. State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 
358, 359 n.l (Utah App. 1993). 
In the instant case, plaintiff argues on appeal that the 
language used in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
relating to visitation during the Christmas school vacation and on 
alternating weekends failed to mirror the language contained in 
Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-35 (1993). (Apb 12) Plaintiff 
5 
attributed this alleged failure to "typographical error" and 
"inadvertence". (Apb 10, 12) 
The Record on Appeal, however, does not reflect any objection 
by plaintiff in the trial court to the language used in the Divorce 
Decree and/or Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating to 
visitation during the Christmas school vacation and on alternating 
weekends. The Record on Appeal and plaintiff's Docketing Statement 
indicate that no post-trial motions were filed. Appellant's brief 
does not include citations to the record showing that each issue 
was preserved in the trial court or provide a statement of the 
grounds for seeking review of issues not preserved at trial. 
"The trial court may correct clerical mistakes in judgments at 
any time" (with leave of the appellate court after an appeal is 
docketed) Bacrnall v. Suburbia Land Co. 579 P. 2d 917, 918 (Utah 
1978) citing Rule 60(a) U.R.C.P. 
An exception to the general rule exists where the trial court 
proceedings demonstrated "plain error". State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 
332, 333 (Utah 1993). Error is plain if it is obvious and harmful. 
State v. Whittle. 780 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989). 
In the instant case, the errors alleged by plaintiff were not 
obvious. Even plaintiff failed to detect them before the trial 
judge signed the Supplemental Divorce Decree. Nor were the errors 
harmful in any substantial way. One would decrease plaintiff's 
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alternate weekend visitation by one hour, the other could possibly 
increase plaintiff's Christmas holiday visitation by as much as 
eight hours. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ALLOWING THE MINOR CHILD TO REGULARLY 
ATTEND CHURCH WITH DEFENDANT 
In Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992), the 
appellant, Mr. Watson, argued that the trial court erred by 
improperly restricting his "normal" visitation rights. The court 
had ordered that "he return the minor child to Mrs. Watson one-half 
hour prior to church services at the conclusion of his alternating 
weekend visitation". 
The appeals court noted that the trial court's visitation 
schedule should be reasonable and provide an adequate basis for 
preserving and fostering the child's relationship with the 
noncustodial parent. After reviewing the visitation schedule, the 
court concluded that Mr. Watson failed to demonstrate how the 
schedule did not meet this standard. The court further concluded 
that "the court's order which requires Mr. Watson to return the 
child so that he may attend his regular church meetings is not so 
unreasonable as to amount to an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court". 837 P.2d at 4. 
In the instant case, plaintiff argues on appeal that Watson is 
no longer valid because after the decision the Utah legislature 
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enacted new advisory guidelines and a minimum visitation schedule 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sections 30-3-33 through 35 (1993). 
(Apb 18, 22) Actually, Utah Code Ann. 30-3-34(2) merely creates a 
rebuttable presumption that the minimum visitation schedule found 
in Utah Code Ann. 30-3-35(2) is in the best interests of the child. 
Thus, the Utah legislature has advised what is "normal" or 
"reasonable" visitation. Plaintiff claims that the presumption can 
only be rebutted by findings that specifically address the eight 
criteria listed in Utah Code Ann. 30-3-34 (2) . (Apb 10) A careful 
reading of this statute clarifies that a finding of any one 
criterion will suffice, including: 
(h) any other criteria the court determines relevant to 
the best interests of the child. 
The record of the floor debate on House Bill No. 32 (1993) 
gives insight into the legislative intent in enacting the 
visitation guidelines and schedule. Rep. Waddoups, the bill's 
sponsor, explained that the purpose was not to make visitation 
equal, but to make it fair and in the best interests of the 
children. He said school children need consistency and a 50%/50% 
division of physical custody would be disruptive. Rep. Bush 
expressed concern about encroaching on the judicial domain. Rep. 
Waddoups responded by explaining that 30-3-34(2)(h) gives a judge 
an option or "wiggle room" to deviate from the visitation schedule. 
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In the Senate, Sen. Hillyard noted the mandatory language used 
under the heading Advisory guidelines and exclaimed, "these are not 
advisory guidelines - they are mandatory guidelines!" He proposed 
an amendment replacing the word "shall" with "are suggested to". 
The amendment passed and this change is reflected in Utah Code Ann. 
30-3-33. Hillyard intimated that the legislature may make the 
guidelines mandatory in the future after an appropriate trial 
period as advisory guidelines. H.R. 32, 51st Leg., 1993 Utah Laws 
131. 
"Where the written findings are incomplete, inadequate, or 
ambiguous, as in this case, they may be elaborated or interpreted 
(in respects not inconsistent therewith) by reference to the trial 
court's written memorandum or its oral explanation of the 
decision". Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const. Co., 677 
P.2d 1120, 1121 ( Utah 1984) (citations omitted). The transcript of 
the trial judge's order (R. 213-244) contains ample findings that 
support the court's view that regular church attendance with 
defendant is in the best interests of the child. 
Plaintiff's claim that the trial court based its decision on 
religious compatibility is a red herring. The real issue 
confronting the trial court was how to provide continuity and a 
stable environment for the minor child. The trial court found: 
"there's a need for stability in the custodial environment". (R. 
9 
218) "Mr. Bargar has a stronger bond and Caitlin has a stronger 
bond with Mr. Bargar at this time than she does with Mrs. Bargar. 
That it would be detrimental if that bond with Mr. Bargar was 
reduced or weakened in any way...." (R. 220; R. 259) 
Also, that during the weekend visitation, the court finds 
that if Caitlin is attending church in the Kaysville 15th 
ward at this time, that would be appropriate to make 
arrangements for her to attend that ward on a regular 
basis. And so if the child can even be brought back 
unless they are out of town, to attend that ward so 
there's a regular continuous sense for the two months 
when it is switched. The court feels that it's 
appropriate that [the] child attend one ward or church on 
as much a basis as possible. 
(R. 235) The trial judge noted the minor child's need for peer 
bonding and regular participation at church. 
But for a child, as you go up and through a preliminary 
area, those kinds of activities, I think it's important 
that there be — If you are going to have her be in one 
ward one week and another ward another week, I don't 
think that is a suitable arrangement, given the 
activities and things that go on. 
(R.237) 
The trial court found that "all of the testimony from the 
experts and the parties show the court that Caitlin must have a 
more stable environment and not go back and forth between the 
parties on a weekly basis." (R. 257) 
The foregoing findings relating to the need for a stable 
environment were in accord with the testimony received at trial 
regarding the best interests of the minor child. See Udy v. Udyf 
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262 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 11 (April 6, 1995). Utah Code Ann. 30-3-
33(2)(1993) states that, "the visitation schedule shall be utilized 
to maximize the continuity and stability of the child's life". 
Plaintiff's appeal evidences more concern for plaintiff's own 
Sunday schedule than creating a stable environment for the minor 
child. 
In determining visitation rights, the trial court 
must give the highest priority to the welfare of the 
children over the desires of the parent. 
Watson Supra quoting Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Utah 
App. 1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988)(quoting Kallas 
v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 1980)). 
As shown above, there are sufficient findings by the trial 
court to rebut the presumption that the minimum visitation schedule 
is in the best interests of the child. In this case, regular 
Sunday church attendance with defendant will provide increased 
stability and continuity in the child's life. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff failed to raise issues relating to visitation during 
the minor child's Christmas school vacation and on alternating 
weekends in the trial court. Also, the trial court proceedings did 
not demonstrate "plain error". Accordingly, plaintiff has waived 
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these issues on appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-34(2) merely creates a rebuttable 
presumption that the minimum visitation schedule found in Utah Code 
Ann. 30-3-35(2) is in the best interests of the child. Findings 
relating to criteria the trial court determines relevant to the 
best interests of the child are sufficient to rebut the statutorily 
created presumption. The trial court determined that continuity 
and stability in the custodial environment is in the child's best 
interests. The court found that regular Sunday church attendance 
with defendant will provide increased stability and continuity in 
the child's life. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing the minor child to regularly attend church with defendant. 
Defendant requests that this court affirm the trial court's 
decree, allow costs on appeal to be taxed against appellant, and 
award defendant reasonable attorney fees on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1995. 
Ronald E. Griffin 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT 
Second Judicial District 
800 West State 
P.O. Box 769 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Re: Frances M. Baraar v. Robert W. Baraar 
Case 924700511 
Dear Judge Memmott: 
Enclosed are the Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Supplemental Decree of Divorce in the 
above matter. These documents were mailed to Mr. Bean for his 
review initially on August 18, 1994. They were subsequently 
modified and mailed to Mr. Bean again on September 9, 1994. I have 
not received the documents back from Mr. Bean approved as to form, 
nor have I received notification of any objections to the form. 
Accordingly, I am forwarding them to you for your signature and 
entry by the Court. Would you please ask your Clerk to notify this 
office when they have been entered so that I can prepare and file 
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